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Abstract 
Recently, Ku and Wang showed that Tseng’s modified authenticated key agreement 
protocol is vulnerable to two attacks and proposed an improvement to withstand these 
attacks. However, this letter will show that this improvement is still vulnerable to the 
modification attack, which is contrary to their claims. Additionally, we proposed an 
improvement to eliminate this security flaw. 
Keywords: Authenticated key agreement, Modification attack, Cryptanalysis 
 
1. Introduction  
Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol [1] is the first practical asymmetric 
cryptographic technique for allowing two parties who never met in advance to 
establish a common secret key over an insecure channel. However, the original 
Diffie-Hellman protocol is vulnerable to the man-in-middle attack, i.e., an adversary 
interposing in the line between two communicating parties could masquerade as one 
communicating party to cheat the other one. This attack is caused by the fact that the 
Diffie-Hellman protocol does not authenticate the participants. 
 To strengthen Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol, Seo and Sweeney [2] 
employed a pre-shared secret password method to provide user authentication. In their 
protocol, two communicating parties, who share a common secret password in 
advance, can exchange two messages to establish the session key. Moreover, they can 
 2 
validate the session key by exchanging two extra messages. Unfortunately, Tseng [3] 
pointed out that the key validation of the Seo-Sweeney protocol is vulnerable to the 
replay attack. Under this attack, the adversary can successfully convince the honest 
party of a wrong session key. To prevent this attack, Tseng proposed an improvement 
to enhance the key validation. 
 Recently, Ku and Wang [4] demonstrated two attacks on Tseng’s enhancement. 
The first one is called backward replay without modification, in which the adversary 
can masquerade as one communicating party to fool the other one into believing the 
wrong session key by replaying the exchanged message. The second one is called 
modification attack, in which the adversary interposing in the line between two 
communicating parties can manipulate the exchanged message to convince one party 
of a wrong session key. They further proposed a countermeasure to eliminate these 
security flaws inherent in Tseng’s improved protocol. However, this letter will show 
that their method is still vulnerable to the modification attack, which is contrary to 
their claims. We first gave brief description of their scheme and then proposed an 
improvement to strengthen the protocol. 
 
2. Brief review of Ku-Wang scheme 
Let n be a large prime and nZg ∈  a generator with order n − 1. Assume that 
two communicating parties, Alice and Bob, share a common password P in advance. 
Alice and Bob can precompute two integers Q and )(mod1 nQ−  from P in any 
predetermined way before performing the key agreement protocol. Detailed 
description of this protocol is given below. 
(1) Key establishment: Procedure of establishing the session key shared between Alice 
and Bob is described as follows. 
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Alice randomly chooses an integer a, computes X1 = g
aQ
 mod n, and then sends 
message (k.1) to Bob. By the same way, Bob sends message (k.2) to Alice, where b is 
a random number chosen by Bob. After that, Alice first computes Y = Y1
1−Q
       
= gb (mod n) and then derives the session key K1 by K1 = Ya mod n. Similarly, Bob 
can obtain the session key K2 = X
b
 mod n, where X = X1
1−Q
= ga (mod n). Note that 
the shared session key is regarded as K1 = K2 = g
ab
 (mod n). 
(2) Key validation: To check the validity of the established session key, Alice and 
Bob should cooperatively perform the following protocol: 
 
 
Alice computes X2 = K1
Q
 mod n and then sends message (v.1) to Bob. Upon receiving 
message (v.1) from Alice, Bob checks whether if X2
1−Q mod n = K2. If it holds, Bob 
is convinced that K2 is validated and then sends message (v.2) to Alice. On the other 
side, if X = ga (mod n) holds, then Alice believes that K1 is verified.  
 
3. Modification attack and the improvement 
Let Eve be an active adversary who interposes the communication between Alice and 
Bob. In the key establishment, Eve could manipulate the exchanged messages to plot 
the modification attack as follows. 
 
 
 
Alice Bob 
(k.1) X1 = gaQ mod n 
(k.2) Y1 = gbQ mod n 
(v.2) X = X1
1−Q mod n 
Alice Bob 
(v.1) X2 = K1Q mod n 
Alice Bob 
(k.1) X1 = gaQ mod n 
(k.2) Y1 = gbQ mod n 
Eve 
(k.1' ) X1' = X1t mod n 
(k.2' ) Y1' = Y1u mod n 
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Upon intercepting message (k.1) sent by Alice, Eve can replace it with message (k.1' ), 
where t is a random integer arbitrarily chosen by her. Similarly, Eve chooses another 
random integer u, computes Y1' = Y1
u
 
mod n, and replaces message (k.2) sent by Bob 
with message (k.2' ). Here, the session key obtained by Alice is K1' = gabu (mod n), 
while that obtained by Bob is K2' = g
abt
 (mod n). To convince Alice and Bob of K1' 
and K2' , Eve will intervene in the key validation as follows. 
 
 
 
On seeing message (v.1) sent by Alice, Eve replaces it with message (v.1' ). Similarly, 
Eve replaces messages (v.2) with (v.2' ). Since X2'
1−Q
= gabt = K2' (mod n), Bob will be 
fooled into believing that his obtained key K2' is verified. Similarly, Alice is also 
deceived that K1' is validated, since X ' 
1−
=
tX = ga (mod n), where X = X1'
1−Q
     
= gat (mod n). It is to see that although Eve cannot obtain K1' or K2' , she can still fool 
Alice and Bob into believing their wrong session keys. 
 
Improved key validation stage: To overcome this modification attack, the improved 
key validation is given as follows: 
 
 
Alice uses her identifier idA and K1 to compute X2 = h(idA, K1), where h is a one-way 
hash function. Then, Alice sends message (v.1) to Bob. Similarly, Bob uses his 
identifier idB and K2 to compute Y2 = h(idB, K2) and then sends message (v.2) to Alice. 
Finally, Alice and Bob can validate their obtained session keys by checking if Y2 = 
h(idB, K1) and X2 = h(idA, K2), respectively.  
(v.2' ) X ' nX t mod1−=  
Alice Bob 
(v.1) X2 = (K1' )Qmod n 
(v.2) X = X1'
1−Q mod n 
Eve 
(v.1' ) X2' nX tu mod
1
2
−
=  
Alice Bob 
(v.1) X2 = h(idA, K1) 
(v.2) Y2 = h(idB, K2) 
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4. Discussions and conclusions  
Consider the scenario of the modification attack as mentioned above, Eve must 
compute gabt mod n and send X2' = h(idA, gabt mod n) to Bob. However, it is 
impossible to obtain gabt mod n since the problem is based on the intractability of 
solving the discrete logarithm problem and the difficulty of compromising the 
password. Hence, Eve cannot fool Bob into believing a wrong session key. For the 
same reason, Eve cannot cheat Alice to accept a wrong session key. Thus, the 
proposed improvement is secure against the modification attack. As compared with 
that of Ku and Wang’s key validation, the computation complexities of the proposed 
improvement reduces two exponentiation operations but requires two more one-way 
hash function operations. 
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